Repeated games Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, France, Shmuel Zamir, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, and the University of Exeter, UK.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Machine generated contents note: 1. Basic results on normal-form games; 2. Basic results on extensive-form games; 3. The beliefs space; 4. General model of repeated games; 5. Recursive games; 6. Incomplete information on two sides; 7. Stochastic games; 8. Extensions and further results; 9. Non-zero-sum games with incomplete information.

"Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at Universite; Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title, "Repeated Games," which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers-many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day"--

"Starting with the basic results of normal form games, the authors move on to review the main properties of repeated games and covering supergames. The author then present the first exhaustive study of repeated games with incomplete information (first on one side then on both sides), including the asymptotic approach and the undiscounted maxmin/minmax. Their analysis then proceeds to stochastic games: Shapley operator, algebraic aspect, asymptotic and uniform approaches. The final section discusses new advances in areas such as incomplete information games with signals; stochastic games with lack of information; and non zero-sum games with incomplete information, including communication devices and equilibria. Game theory is extensively used in economics and other social sciences. This book offers a comprehensive treatment of repeated games. Starting with the basic results of normal form games, the authors move on to review the main properties of repeated games, covering supergames, games with incomplete information, and stochastic games. The final section discusses new advances in areas such as incomplete information games with signals and stochastic games with lack of information, and non zero-sum games with incomplete information including communication devices and equilibria"--